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Abstract: Understanding the mental states of our social partners allows us to successfully interact 
with the world around us. Mental state attributions are argued to underpin social attention, and 
have been shown to modulate attentional orienting to social cues. However, recent research has 
disputed this claim, arguing that this effect may arise as an unintentional side effect of study design, 
rather than through the involvement of mentalising processes. This study therefore aimed to 
establish whether the mediation of gaze cueing by mental state attributions generalises beyond the 
specific experimental paradigm used in previous research. The current study used a gaze cueing 
paradigm within a change detection task, and the gaze cue was manipulated such that participants 
were aware that the cue-ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱȱ ǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
participants were influenced by the mental state of the cue-agent, and were significantly better at 
identifying if a change had occurred on valid trials when they believed the cue-ȱȱȁȂǯȱ
The computation of the cue-Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
demonstrating that the modulation of gaze cueing by mental state attributions generalises to other 
experimental paradigms. 
Keywords: mental states; theory of mind; gaze cueing; social attention 
 
1. Introduction 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ
desires, and intentionsȯan ability known as theory of mind (ToM) [1]. Through the act of taking 
Ȃȱǰȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯ 
Mental state attributions (MSAs) guide attention to subtle social cues and information that might 
otherwise go unheeded, thereby allowing us to successfully integrate with the social world around 
us. Indeed, one influential but controversial idea is that the ability to make mental state attributions 
underpins the phenomenon of social attention [2] and therefore occurs prior to gaze following.  
Social attention is often operationalized using a gaze-cueing task [3]. In the canonical version of 
this task, a participant is shown a face with the eyes averted, such that it appears to be looking at one 
side of the display. A stimulus is then presented on the side of the display the face is gazing at (a 
valid trial), or contralaterally to the direction of gaze (an invalid trial). The participant must quickly 
and accurately identify the target while maintaining fixation at the center of the screen. A robust 
finding is that reaction times are significantly faster on valid trials (i.e., when gaze direction is 
congruent with target location). The shift of social attention elicited in the gaze-cueing task is often 
characterized as a rapid, reflexive process [4], but the cognitive processes underlying this form of 
social attention appear to be dissociated from those involved in reflexive orienting to salient 
peripheral cues. For example, reflexive orienting is known to rely on the ability to program eye-
movements [5,6], whereas social attention does not [7]. Indeed, several lines of evidence are typically 
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cited in favour of an alternative, mental state attribution hypothesis of social attention. Both children 
[8] and adults [9] have been shown to differentially follow a gaze cue depending on whether its eyes 
are open or closed/masked, suggesting that the observers are accounting for the perspective of the 
cue in tasks that engage social attention. In a key study, Teufel and colleagues [2] directly 
ȱȱȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ ȱ£ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
participants watched videos of an actor wearing one of two pairs of coloured goggles. Prior to the 
experiment, participants were informed that the actor could see through one of the pairs of goggles 
but not through the other. Teufel et al. carried out two experiments, the first with a non-predictive 
gaze cue and the second with a counter-predictive gaze cue. In the first experiment, there was a 
significantly larger gaze cueing effect when participants believed that the cue-agent could see. In the 
second experiment, participants were significantly less able to suppress reflexive gaze cueing when 
they believed that the cue-agent could see. In a related study, Wiese and colleagues manipulated 
Ȃȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ -stimulus was being intentionally controlled, and observed 
greater gaze cueing effects when participants attributed intentional states to the cue [10]. Taken 
together, these results suggest that mental state attributions interacted with, and mediated the gaze 
cueing effect, thereby modulating attentional orienting in response to a social cue.  
However, more recent research has contested this interpretation, arguing instead that these 
studies confound mentalising processes with changes to the physical properties of the stimulus. In 
particular, masking the eyes of the stimulus has been argued to lead to the weaker gaze cueing effects 
found [11,12]. Indeed, in a series of experiments designed to explicitly test the mental state attribution 
ǰȱȱȱȱǽŗŗǾȱȱȱȁ-of-Ȃȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
between the cue-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȁȂ to create the impression that 
the cue-agent could either see or not see through these barriers. Contrary to Teufel et al. [2], Cole et 
al. observed no effect of mental state attribution on gaze cueing. This null effect was even observed 
in vivo, when the cue was a real person gazing to left and right, leading Cole et al. to conclude that 
gaze cueing did not depend on a mental state attribution. Similarly, others have proposed that the 
apparent modulation of social attention by mental state attribution actually arises as a side effect of 
study design [13,14]. Together, these studies suggest that either gaze-cuing is driven by non-
mentalistic processes, or if mentalistic processes do contribute, they only do so under very highly 
constrained experimental situations.  
	ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȂȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǯȂȱȱȱȱ
the effects of mental state attribution on gaze cueing did not generalise to other tasks, an important 
¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ effect generalises beyond the specific experimental 
paradigm reported by Teufel. The current study therefore aimed to replicate and modify the study 
reported by Teufel et al. [2]. Specifically, while our mental state manipulation followed the format of 
Teufel et al. [2] with the gaze cue pictured wearing one of two pairs of coloured sunglasses; one 
ȱ ȱȁȂǰȱȱȱ ȱȁ-Ȃǰȱȱ ȱthree methodological changes.  
First, following Cole and colleagues, we used a change detection paradigm [15,16] rather than a 
timed discrimination task. The effects reported by Teufel et al. were only present when they analysed 
the Inverse Efficiency and not the RT data. This analysis is potentially problematic, as IE is only 
appropriate when there is no speed-accuracy tradeoff. This may not have been the case in some 
conditions in Teufel et al. [2] (see Table 1, Long SOA condtion where participants are slower but more 
accurate in the Valid condition). It is therefore important to establish that the effect of mental state 
attribution can be observed using other measures of performance. Change detection tasks are more 
sensitive to behavioural changes [17] and less susceptible to noise [18] than response time tasks and 
highly sensitive to attention, such that participants are significantly more accurate at identifying 
changes that occur at a cued location [19Ȯ21], thus giving us the best possible chance of observing 
subtle modulations of cueing that may be lost in RT tasks.  
ǰȱ ȱȱȁȂȱȱ ȱȁ-Ȃȱǰȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ
conditions. This allowed us to examine whether participants could flexibly update their mental state 
attributions on a trial-by-trial basis. This manipulation is an important modification of the previous 
work, as using a blocked design may have encouraged participants to adopt an attention control 
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setting that suppressed orienting in response to the red glasses. For example, Folk, Remington, and 
Johnston [22] have shown that participants can suppress reflexive orienting to peripheral cues in 
blocks of trials in which the peripheral cue does not share physical properties with the target. Indeed, 
they showed that a red colour singleton failed to summon attention if the target was a luminance 
change. If participants can adopt an attentional set that suppresses covert orienting, one might argue 
that the results of Teufel et al. arise from this control setting rather than the effect of mental state 
attribution per se. Importantly, these attention set effects are very hard to implement when the 
participant does not know the identity of the cue at the start of the trial.  
Finally, participants were given no explicit instruction to adopt the mental state of the cue. This 
is important because it offers a stronger test of the idea that the mental state attribution occurs 
spontaneously and without requiring conscious effort by the participant to take the perspective of 
the cue-stimulus. It is also possible that the very act of asking participants to report on the mental 
state of the avatar makes the participant believe that mental states are important, and they are 
¡ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȁ-seeiȂȱǯȱ  
To briefly summarise, Teufel et al. [2] argue that social attention is mediated by mental state 
attribution. This idea has been highly influential, but we believe some caution is required before 
accepting this conclusion. First, the original analysis may violate some of the requirements for using 
Inverse Efficiency, secondly the use of a blocked design may allow participants to adopt attentional 
control settings that confound the effects of mental state attribution, and thirdly, explicitly instructing 
participants to consider mental states introduces a task demand that may influence the pattern of 
responses. To address these issues we adapted the Teufel et al. [2], paradigm such that participants 
were shown two brief videos, each approximately 15 s in length (Video S1: GlassesDemo.wmv). The 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ
Participants then performed a change detection task in which a cue-agent could be looking at the 
item that changed, or one of the distracters. Critically, trials where the cue-ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ
where he could not were randomly interleaved. In line with TeȱȱǯȱǽŘǾȂȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ
ȱȂȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ-agent. We therefore 
expected that participants would be significantly more likely to detect if a change had occurred on 
the valid trials in the seeing, compared to the non-seeing, condition. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Thirty-four participants (24 female and 10 male), with a mean age of 24 years (range = 19Ȯ40, SD 
= 4.60) took part in the study. Undergraduate Psychology students received course credit for taking 
part. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, and all 
participants gave informed consent before participating. All participants had normal, or corrected to 
normal, vision.  
2.2. Design 
The study used a within-subjects design with three independent variables: condition (seeing or 
non-seeing), validity (valid or invalid), and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) (180 ms or 1080 ms). 
The use of two SOAs allowed a measure of early processing and later top-down effects. The 
experimental trials were randomised across these three variables. The study paradigm was a change 
detection task, which required participants to correctly identify if one of four symbols (displayed in 
each corner of the screen) had changed. 
2.3. Materials & Apparatus 
All stimuli were generated using a ViSaGe graphics card (Cambridge Research Sytems Ltd, 
Kent, UK). Responses were collected using a keyboard. The paradigm used photographs of an actor 
wearing a pair of either red or yellow sunglasses. Participants were informed that the actor was only 
Vision 2018, 2, 11  4 of 8 
 
ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
counterbalanced between participants. Therefore, half of the participants were informed that the 
ȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱ ȱȱ
¢ ȱǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱ
whilst wearing the yellow sunglasses but  ȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ
total, there were eight photographs of the actor wearing each pair of sunglasses whilst facing in four 
different directions, corresponding to the four corners of the screen. Each photograph used the same 
actor, and the stimuli for each condition differed only on the colour of the sunglasses used. The cue-
agent was centrally presented and appeared to gaze at one of four probe stimuli (Figure 1). The probe 
stimuli consisted of four letters, one in each corner of the screen. These could be either E, U, O, P, S, 
F, H, L, or A and measured 1.8 × 1.8 cm. The probe stimuli appeared 5 cm away from the initial 
fixation point. 
 
Figure 1. The experimental procedure. Trial types were randomised based on validity, condition, and 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The figure illustrates a valid trial. 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were positioned 57 cm away from the display with their heads in a chinrest. Each 
participant completed three blocks of 80 trials, completing 240 trials in total. The study had 20% valid 
trials, 60% invalid trials, and 20% catch trials, in which no change occurred. As there were four 
potential stimulus locations, a 4:1 ratio of valid to invalid trials was necessary to ensure that the gaze 
cue was non-predictive of change location. 
Prior to starting the main experiment participants were shown two brief videos, each 
approximately 15 s in length (Video S1: GlassesDemo.wmv). The videos were designed to instil the 
ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ hilst wearing one of the pairs of coloured sunglasses and could 
ȱȁȂȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ an object 
ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȁ-Ȃȱ, the actor took time to search for 
and identify the item placed in front of them, ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
item. The use of the videos allowed the parȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
with the type of glasses they were wearing, allowing an immediate attribution to be made upon 
seeing the actor in the experiment. It was emphasised that the direction in which the actor faced was 
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non-predictive and would not indicate where the change would occur. Further, during the 
experiment participants were not asked to recall, and neither were they reminded of, whether the 
ȱȱȁȂǯȱ  
Trials began with the onset of a fixation point, which was present for 1000 ms. This was replaced 
with the stimulus array containing four letters, each placed in one of the four corners of the screen for 
500 ms. The cue was present for either 100 ms or 1000 ms. The display was then masked for 80 ms, 
after which the screen refreshed to a new display of the stimulus head and four symbols (Figure 1). 
The participant was then required to indicate, via specific buttons on the computer keyboard, 
 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȁȂȱ ȱȁȂǲȱȱȱ
ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
changed. 
3. Results 
Four participants had a high rate of reporting false positives (>35%) on the catch trials and were 
excluded from the final analysis, leaving a final sample of 30 participants. A 2 × 2 × 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA, with factors of condition (seeing/non-seeing), SOA (short/long), and validity 
(valid/invalid) on the probability of correctly identifying a change revealed a main effect of condition 
(F(1,29) = 7.553, p = 0.010, ΋Ε² = 0.207), as the proportion of correct responses was greater for seeing 
trials; a main effect of SOA (F(1,29) = 37.953, p < 0.001, ΋Ε² = 0.567), as the proportion of correct 
responses was greater for the long SOA; and a main effect of validity (F(1,29) = 5.371, p = 0.028, ΋Ε² = 
0.156), as the proportion of correct responses was greater for the valid trials. Importantly for the study 
hypothesis, there was a significant validity × condition interaction (F(1,29) = 5.143, p = 0.031, ΋Ε² = 
0.151). There was no SOA × validity × condition interaction, (F(1,29) = 0.630, p = 0.43, ΋Ε² = 0.021) 
indicating that the nature of the validity × condition interaction did not differ between the short/long 
SOA. 
The significant validity × condition interaction was analysed using paired samples t-tests. The 
analysis revealed that participants were significantly more likely to detect a change in the seeing 
condition when the cue was valid (M = 0.66, SD = 0.18), compared to when the cue was invalid (M = 
0.54, SD = 0.20; t(29) = 3.002, p = 0.005, dz = 0.55). By contrast, in the non-seeing condition participants 
did not display this cueing effect and there was no significant difference between the valid (M = 0.57, 
SD = 0.21) and invalid trials (M = 0.54, SD = 0.20; t(29) = 0.903, p = 0.374, dz = 0.17). Taken together, 
these results demonstrate that participants were influenced by the mental state of the cue-agent as 
when the cue-agent could see, validly cued targets were more likely to be detected than invalidly 
cued targets. However, when the cue-agent could not see, validly cued targets were no more likely 
to be detected than invalidly cued targets (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The probability of correctly identifying a change on the valid and invalid trials in the seeing 
and non-seeing conditions. Error bars show +/ƺ1 within-subject standard error of the mean (S.E.M).  
* Indicates p < 0.05. 
4. Discussion 
In the current study, we used a gaze cueing paradigm within a change detection task to 
investigate to what extent the modulation of gaze-cueing by mental state attributions observed by 
Teufel et al. [2] generalised to other tasks. The results demonstrated that participants were 
significantly more likely to correctly detect a change when the cue was valid, and they believed the 
cue-agent to be able to see. This therefore confirms that participants were affected by the perceived 
mental state of the cue-agent, and that this modulated the gaze cueing effect present in the data. 
¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
performance on a change detection task. Our results offer an important extension of previous studies, 
demonstrating that a mental state attribution can directly affect our perception of visual stimuli, in 
ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
locations within the visual array.  
Of key importance, our participants showed the effect of a mental state attribution when seeing 
and non-seeing trials were randomly interleaved, thus ruling out the possibility that change in gaze 
cueing were caused by the adoption of an attentional set across a block of trials. As participants were 
never directly asked to register the mental state of the agent, we can also confidently exclude the 
ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȁ-Ȃȱȱ ȱȱo demand characteristics. 
Further, whilst Teufel et al. argued that MSAs automatically mediated reflexive gaze cueing, the 
experimental paradigm used within their study relied upon the explicit application of a mental state. 
During the current study, participants were never explicitly asked to consider the perspective of the 
agent and yet still showed the effect of a mental state attribution, suggesting that participants 
implicitly attributed a mental state to the cue-agent. These results are therefore consistent with those 
of Teufel and colleagues [2] and additionally indicate that MSAs can occur implicitly, without 
conscious awareness, and yet still modulate social attention.  
On first inspection, the results from this study are not consistent with recent research claiming 
that mental states attributions do not influence attentional orienting [11]. However, this difference 
may arise from the nature of the mental state manipulation used within each paradigm. Line-of-sight 
manipulations, such as the use of barriers [11,12,14], rely upon alterations within the stimulus display 
in order to alter the perspective of the cue-agent. This may be a critical difference, as manipulating 
the cue-agent rather than the environment may make it easier for mental state attributions to 
modulate gaze cueing. Specifically, when mental states are changed by altering the cue-agent, the 
information about gaze direction and mental state are available at the same location, which is the 
location the participant is fixating. In this case, gaze direction and mental state may be computed 
simultaneously and thus have greater opportunity to interact. However, when mental states are 
changed by altering the environment, the relevant information is spatially separate, such that gaze 
direction is available at fixation, but information about whether the line of sight is open or occluded 
is in the periphery. This manipulation arguably adds an extra level of complexity to the paradigm 
[23]. In this case, participants might process the centrally presented gaze cue first and then compute 
the mental state. Given the speed of reflexive gaze cueing, it may be that attention is oriented before 
it can be modulated by mental state attributions. We therefore tentatively propose that MSA can 
influence attentional orienting when information about the mental state and the gaze cue are found 
at the same location.  
One other key difference between this and previous studies is the use of videos prior to the main 
experiment. The videos were designed to instill the knowledge of when the actor could or could not 
see and extend the usual use of written or verbal instructions [2]. Arguably the videos allowing the 
ȱȱ ¡ȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ -life setting) acted to reinforce the 
theory of mind processes drawn upon when completing the experimental task, therefore promoting 
the effects found within this study. Therefore, a combination of the use of a more sensitive task and 
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more direct mental state manipulation may have led to the perspective taking effects found within 
the current study.  
5. Conclusions 
This study investigated whether the attribution of a mental state to a cue-agent mediated 
attentional orienting within a change detection task. Our results clearly supported our predictions, 
with participants significantly more likely to correctly identify if a change had occurred on valid trials 
when they believed that the cue-ȱ ȱȱȱȁȂǯȱȱȱȱȱ-Ȃȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱrmance on a perceptual task, demonstrating that the 
attribution of mental states mediates the gaze cueing effect and can influence the perception of visual 
information around us. 
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at www.mdpi.com/2411-5150/2/1/11/s1, Video S1: 
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